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Abstract: Carson’s work is often praised (and sometimes con-
demned) for its simplicity and lyricism, its “sensitive literary 
style.” My engagement with Silent Spring explores this idea of 
literariness, tracing the formal qualities and rhetorical strategies 
of her oeuvre: the ecology of allusion and quotation that it gen-
erates, the metaphors and genres that it draws on. In doing so, 
it argues that the celebrated accessibility of her writing is in fact 
a carefully worked-for effect. The simplicity of Silent Spring, in 
other words, is more complex than it first appears: a quality that 
lent the book much of its power yet also rendered it vulnerable in 
other ways. At the same time, I hope to read Carson’s public sci-
ence writing alongside the anti-globalisation protest of Arundhati 
Roy, probing the relation between the simple and the complex in 
contemporary environmentalism. Both turned their attention to 
explicitly instrumental writing after winning fame for more “liter-
ary” texts, both questioned the credibility of the male expert, and 
both deployed the intimate address of the essay form for polemi-
cal effect. Roy’s work also allows us to see how Carson’s version 
of environmentalism looks from the developing world: how the 
ideas of ecology, toxicity, and “slow violence” that Silent Spring 
did much to introduce into public culture might play out in a 
postcolony like South Africa.
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To never simplify what is complicated or complicate what is 
simple.
Arundhati Roy, “The End of Imagination” (1998)
While rereading Rachel Carson on the fiftieth anniversary of Silent 
Spring, first published in 1962, I found myself in the University of Cape 
Town’s library basement to track down a first edition of The Sea Around 
Us (1951). This was her breakthrough work, the second book of the 
great ocean trilogy that preceded her campaign against DDT and other 
pesticides. Tucked into it was a clipped-out review with the price of the 
book given as 12s 6d, but no date or publication details:
Miss Rachel Carson, supported by consultation with leading 
oceanographers, and having herself taken part in a marine ex-
pedition, presents a vivid account of the sea which will not 
only illuminate for the general reader the fundamental biolog-
ical importance of its problems, but which derives a special 
character from her use of a sensitive literary style to give expres-
sion to the intrinsic beauty of natural phenomena.
The short notice is largely positive but remarks that the book “is not free 
of the oversimplification which is so difficult to avoid in covering such a 
vast field in a limited space.”
 One finds in this notice many standard responses to her work as well 
as some more buried clues relating to its context and reception. “Miss 
Carson” (implying her unmarried status) is congratulated for her “sensi-
tive literary style,” but this is a double-edged quality. Her book is praised 
for mediating between scientific experts and “the general reader”: the 
result is vividness and aesthetic pleasure but also the danger of oversim-
plification. “Miss Carson” has no PhD and no academic affiliation, but 
the text is nonetheless underwritten by the work of leading experts. 
The Sea Around Us was in fact the work of a maverick synthesiser, 
a digest of ten years of oceanographic research. This began with her 
first work, Under the Sea-Wind (1941), which appeared just before Pearl 
Harbour and so made little impact on a public that was soon consumed 
with the American war effort. By contrast, her 1951 bestseller benefited 
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directly from naval technologies developed during World War II, es-
pecially the mapping of the ocean bed via sonar. (Leftover warplanes, 
on the other hand, would be used in the 1950s for the indiscriminate 
spraying of pesticides that Carson opposed.) The Sea Around Us quotes 
Shelley and Swinburne, accessing the literary Romanticism that Carson 
had immersed herself in while at college and which would also pro-
vide, via John Keats, the title of Silent Spring. Yet it was also undeniably 
a product of (and perhaps simultaneously, an antidote to) the United 
States’ unprecedented economic and technological dominance in the 
mid-twentieth century. The result is an oeuvre in which the relations 
between those terms that reconstitute themselves endlessly as the di-
chotomies of popular environmentalism—nature and culture; science 
and sentiment; technological “progress” versus ecological “balance”—
are complex, ambivalent, and intriguing. So what kinds of texts are 
these? What idea of “science” do they embody? And what are words like 
“sensitive” and “literary” doing in this context? 
With these as points of departure, my engagement with Silent Spring 
argues for Carson’s continued importance in ways that turn on the 
question of style. Firstly, I probe the idea of “literariness” within her 
work—tracing the texts’ formal qualities and rhetorical strategies, their 
metaphors and the genres they draw on—and so suggest that the cel-
ebrated accessibility and even naïveté of her writing is in fact a carefully 
worked-for effect. The “simplicity” of Silent Spring, in other words, is 
more complex than it appears: a quality that lent the book much of 
its power (and audience) yet also rendered it vulnerable in other ways. 
This leads to a broader enquiry into the relation between the simple and 
the complex in contemporary environmentalism as concepts and tropes, 
but also as styles, techniques, and modes of address.
At the same time, I hope to read Carson’s public science writing 
alongside the activism of Arundhati Roy. Despite many differences, 
there are points of contact between the work of these two courageous 
writers: both turned their attention to explicitly instrumental writing 
after winning fame for more “literary” texts; both questioned the cred-
ibility of the male “expert” and were subject to a fierce backlash as a 
result.2 It is revealing also to consider Carson and Roy as writers at very 
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different points on the trajectory of twentieth-century environmen-
tal activism. For Carson in 1962, the challenge is rhetorical newness; 
for Roy, writing at the turn of the third millennium, it is rhetorical 
exhaustion. At the beginning of her anti-nuclear essay, “The End of 
Imagination” (1998), the latter writes memorably that even if there 
is nothing new or original left to be said about nuclear weapons (or, 
one might add, deforestation, species loss, climate change), “let’s pick 
our parts, put on these discarded costumes and speak our second-hand 
lines in this sad second-hand play. But let’s not forget that the stakes 
we’re playing for are huge. Our fatigue and our shame could mean the 
end of us” (122). It is intriguing to read this alongside Time magazine’s 
1962 review of Silent Spring, which described Carson’s case as “unfair, 
one-sided and hysterically over-emphatic” and went on: “Many of the 
scary generalizations . . . are patently unsound. ‘It is not possible’, says 
Miss Carson, ‘to add pesticides to water anywhere without threaten-
ing the purity of water everywhere.’ It takes only a moment of reflec-
tion to show that this is nonsense” (Burnside and Riordan 19). Such a 
claim, though, is now taken as read: it has axiomatic status in modern 
environmentalism. To read such an accusation today is to realize 
how Carson was struggling to bring into focus concepts of ecological 
complexity and global pollution that are now held as self-evident, as 
“natural.”
Yet equally, the comparison with Roy also allows one to consider what 
such naturalisation entails and how a key text of North American en-
vironmentalism reads from the global South. Which of Carson’s ideas 
travel well, and which come to seem limited in a postcolonial context—
one where practices of nature conservation have so often been linked to 
political conservatism? Silent Spring has attracted considerable critical 
attention as a foundational text in American ecocriticism,3 but how do 
the concepts of ecology, toxicity, and “slow violence” that her writing 
did much to introduce into public discourse play out in a space like 
South Africa?
As such, this piece also represents a series of responses to Rob Nixon’s 
Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (2011), surely a 
major document in thinking through the often uneasy relation between 
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Anglo-American environmentalism and those methods of critical en-
quiry indebted to cultural materialism, literary theory, and postcolonial 
thought. Beyond the obvious relevance of Nixon’s book to Carson as 
it considers forms of violence which are invisible and attritional—the 
“long dyings” and “disasters that are anonymous and star nobody” (3), 
the “calamities that patiently dispense their devastation while remain-
ing outside our flickering attention spans” (6)—I hope to take up its 
enquiry into genre. 
Concerned throughout with the matter of both political and aesthetic 
representation, Nixon explores how public intellectuals and writer-ac-
tivists from the developing world seek to give narrative, figurative, and 
affective shape to those “formless threats whose fatal repercussions are 
dispersed across space and time” (3). In each chapter, a crisis is paired 
with a different literary mode: Bhopal and its aftermath are explored 
through the “environmental picaresque” of Indra Sinha’s Animal’s People 
(2007); US petro-imperialism in the Gulf is seen through the lens of 
Abdelrahman Munif ’s novel cycle, Cities of Salt (1984); Ken Saro-Wiwa’s 
and Wangari Maathai’s protests against oil drilling and deforestation re-
spectively are considered in terms of the “movement memoir” and its 
difficulties—how an autobiographical text is also required to function 
as the “biography” of a social collective. In India, writing against the 
hyper-nationalist discourse of megadam builders and the strategic im-
personality of the World Bank report, Roy deploys the intimate address 
of the essay for polemical effect. As a “small, nimble form,” it (Nixon 
suggests) “allowed her to take on the weighty, leaden genres that gave 
ballast to the . . . culture of developmental gigantism” (168)—a shape-
shifting writerly strategy which, I will argue, has intriguing parallels 
with Carson’s approach. 
As the second half of Nixon’s title implies, such examples are intended 
to dismantle the much-recycled accusation that environmentalism is the 
preserve of rich Westerners—an accusation in which the difference be-
tween reactionary and progressive critique can be difficult to discern. Yet 
at the same time, the book is alert throughout to the uneasy relationship 
between environmentalist and postcolonial methodologies, particu-
larly as they have evolved in the Anglo-American academy. If postco-
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lonial theory has concerned itself with ideas of hybridity, cross-cultural 
mixing, displacement, migrancy, and the recovery of silenced histories, 
then ecocriticism has often been concerned with their opposites: dis-
courses of purity, conservation, regionalism, and solitude—moments of 
timeless communion with nature.4 
One of the main charges Nixon levels against (North) American envi-
ronmentalism is that it has remained scandalously parochial. That is to 
say, it is content with discussing and deconstructing images of the wild 
(or not-so-wild) West while remaining almost entirely un-engaged with 
the long-term consequences of American foreign policy: the “offshore 
histories” of nuclear testing in the Pacific and depleted uranium in Iraq. 
In the year that Silent Spring was published, it is worth remembering, 
Operation Ranch Hand commenced the spraying of herbicides and de-
foliants like Agent Orange in Vietnam.5 And if Carson is one of the 
guiding inspirations mentioned in the Preface to Slow Violence, then an-
other is the great scholar of culture and imperialism Edward Said, who 
(Nixon recalls) was largely dismissive of environmentalism but offered 
guidance in other ways: 
He thrived on intellectual complexity while aspiring to clarity; 
he taught and wrote as if—and I know this should sound un-
remarkable for a literature professor—he yearned to be widely 
understood. His approach felt fervent, luminous when mea-
sured against the alternatives: close readings sealed against the 
world or deconstructionist seminars in which the stakes were 
as obscure as the language. . . . His devotion to style became 
integral to his political idealism and inseparable from his belief 
in insurrectionary outwardness. (x)
When contemporary reviewers lauded Carson’s “sensitive,” “literary,” or 
“lyrical” prose, they were no doubt using the common idea of style as 
something extrinsic to discourse—a kind of attractive coating or deco-
rative flourish. (Indeed, one cannot help feeling that these adjectives in 
the hands of some reviewers work to dismiss or at least disarm certain 
aspects of Carson’s writing, damning it with faint praise.) In the wake 
of twentieth-century linguistic and literary theory, however, the notion 
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of style as something external to content is untenable. Nixon’s tribute to 
Said broaches the idea that it is something altogether more fundamental 
(and fundamentally political) to a writer’s approach. Carson’s carefully 
worked-for simplicity is approached here as intrinsic to and constitutive 
of her entire ethic: as a tactic, as a method, and as a way of calibrating 
the relation between a dense informational load and the demands of a 
wider social body.
While her prose is unaffected by complexity at the level of the sen-
tence, her texts generate an intricate “literary ecology” of quotation and 
allusion—yet one which is painstakingly underwritten by her training 
in public science writing. And so the vision of ecology that her writing 
discloses is more robust than the sometimes uncritical and sentimental 
use of that term by green-minded literary critics (or literary-minded 
environmentalists). Silent Spring, in other words, is a text suffused with 
both Literature and “the literature”—it partakes of both the English 
Romantic canon and the cusp of scientific research. Revisiting it in our 
time and place might allow us to think more cogently and fluidly about 
how social and natural worlds are figured in contemporary environmen-
talism. For this is a domain in which there are, after all, powerful inter-
ests intent on simplifying the complicated and complicating the simple.
I
. . . by rock and heath and pine . . . 
Rudyard Kipling, “Song of the Cities” (1893)
In exploring the contemporary resonances of Carson’s text from the 
global South and in thinking about how its ideas of the environment 
have travelled, it seems appropriate to consider my immediate surround-
ings at the University of Cape Town: how the physical (and even geo-
logical) context here might shape our conditions of intellectual enquiry. 
Silent Spring takes its title from John Keats’ “La Belle Dame Sans 
Merci,” with a line from the poem serving as an epigraph: 
 The sedge is wither’d from the lake
    And no birds sing.
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Yet birdsong, or its absence, takes on a rather unexpected association in 
our local habitat. A little further up the slopes of this campus, one finds 
a statue of the nineteenth-century mining magnate and empire builder 
Cecil Rhodes, gazing toward the African hinterland. At one point in 
his short but energetic life, Rhodes attempted to introduce a variety 
of songbirds to the slopes of Table Mountain, apparently from a desire 
to hear the sound of English woodland again before his death.6 The 
scheme was unsuccessful—only the chaffinch proved able to “naturalise” 
itself—but this was only one element of a much broader programme of 
green imperialism that makes the Rhodes Estate around us a complex 
and carefully manufactured cultural landscape.7
In an odd turn of colonial history, the Keatsian nightingale, “pour-
ing forth thy soul abroad” (845), arrives here as a by-product of indus-
trial modernity: the large-scale mine workings at Kimberley and the 
Witwatersrand where Rhodes made his fortune. If for Carson birdsong 
came to symbolise an environment under threat from man’s chemi-
cal ingenuity and meddling in complex natural systems, then on these 
slopes it was inflected with the grand designs of settler-colonialism—an 
index of precisely such an impulse to remake the environment in the 
image of one’s own native land. The arch-imperialist was also an early 
conservationist, using his enormous wealth to buy up the mountain 
flanks, demolishing unsightly water reservoirs and creating a protected 
parkland that still stretches south from the shoulder of Table Mountain 
through the botanical gardens at Kirstenbosch to Cecilia Forest, named 
(like Rhodesia) after its patron. 
Along with the nightingales and chaffinches, Rhodes installed 
Roman lion cages, Mediterranean stone pines, oak avenues, deer parks, 
llama paddocks, summer houses, and hydrangea beds. He also built a 
“cottage in the woods for poets and artists” where they could draw in-
spiration from the mountain (Baker 44)—“[t]hrough a tap, as it were,” 
wrote William Plomer in his satirical 1933 biography of Rhodes. 
“Unfortunately, when turned on, the tap seems to have produced little 
but mountain mist and a few hiccups of patriotic fervour,” he added 
(140). The barbed lines no doubt refer in part to the South African 
output of Rudyard Kipling, who stayed at the Woolsack cottage almost 
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every year between 1900 and 1907 yet never produced the master-
piece of British South Africa that his patron was expecting. Lines from 
Kipling’s tub-thumping “Song of the Cities” (1893) are duly engraved 
below the Rhodes statue on campus:
I dream my dream by rock and heath and pine 
Of Empire to the northward. Ay, one land
From Lion’s Head to Line! (177)
Positioned on a grand architectural axis, aligned with the vast rock walls 
of Devil’s Peak above, there could hardly be a more glaring collusion of 
natural and imperial grandeur. It is worth noting, too, that there is a line 
missing from the monument. The first part of the stanza—about the co-
lonial beachhead of “Capetown” being “[s]natched and bartered oft from 
hand to hand” (177)—is omitted, throwing out the rhyme. No doubt 
this allusion to warring Dutch, British, and French interests would have 
troubled the notion of a tranquil, pastoral “Cape Dutch” past, following 
which the nineteenth-century British imperial presence could be seen as 
the “natural” continuation of an earlier colonial stewardship. Encoded 
in the idyll of elegant gabled buildings and picturesque wine farms, it 
is an invented tradition that has worked for generations to efface the 
history of Cape slavery and is still very much part of the Western Cape’s 
cultural identity—and certainly its tourist industry.
I make this historical detour so as to return to the matter of Carson’s 
“simplicity” not before but after a consideration of the complexity that is 
entailed in thinking through the various cultures of nature in a place like 
South Africa. The memorials to Rhodes dotted around the city so obvi-
ously reveal a nature that does the work of culture: the suppressed line 
quite literally entails an effacement of the historical via the geographical; 
the rhetoric of settler-imperialism finds direct uses for the Romantic 
sublime. And if Kipling was one Nobel laureate who wrote on these 
slopes, another was J. M. Coetzee, whose early work is in many ways a 
fraught interrogation of all the violence and inequity that lies beneath 
versions of the colonial pastoral or the “story of an African farm”—to 
adapt the title of Olive Schreiner’s remarkable 1883 novel set in the 
semi-arid Karoo. Read via Coetzee’s unsentimental critique of land and 
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language in South African letters, Kipling’s Rhodesian lines about “[t]
he granite of the ancient north” and “[g]reat spaces washed with sun” 
(209) partake of a recurring topos in the (white) South African liter-
ary imagination.8 This is what Coetzee calls the “dream topography” 
of a silent, ancient Africa measured in geological aeons: a prehistoric 
landmass absent of any indigenous human presence that might contra-
dict the claims of European settlement (White Writing 6–7). In a less 
guarded moment, he speaks in 1988 of South Africa’s “hereditary mas-
ters” as follows:
To be blunt: their love is not enough today and has not been 
enough since they arrived on the continent; furthermore, their 
talk, their excessive talk about how they love South Africa has 
consistently been directed towards the land, that is, towards 
what is least likely to respond to love: mountains and deserts, 
birds and animals and flowers. (“Jerusalem Prize” 97; emphasis 
in original) 
The sylvan scenes around us, then, are hardly innocent. Birdsong, as the 
signifier of a quintessential Englishness and Romanticism, joins a range 
of other culturally loaded practices with regard to the natural world, 
generating a complex topography in which matters of (trans)plantation, 
mimicry, and hybridity (botanical, zoological, cultural) become ineluc-
tably entangled. So how are we to take the apparent simplicity and even 
naïveté of Carson’s style in a place where natural history has so often 
involved a silencing of social history, where (as Nixon writes) “nature 
reserves” and “native reserves” have shadowed each other uncomfortably 
in successive political administrations (176)? 
Such questions underscore how the environmental humanities occupy 
a distinct and difficult niche in the academy, making them an uneasy 
partner to methods of critical enquiry indebted to cultural materialism, 
Marxian thought, or postcolonial theory—all those modes of brushing 
cultural texts against the grain that have dominated literary departments 
since the 1970s. And certainly, one can see the importance of the latter 
when tracing how culturally loaded versions of the environment con-
tinue to play out in the twenty-first-century postcolony. 
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Again, we can turn to the very local matter of the long-standing 
debates about “indigenous” versus “alien” flora and fauna on Table 
Mountain. For many years, this remained a largely suburban and faintly 
comic spat between (as one cartoonist had it) “pro-pine neo-nazis” and 
“anti-pine eco-fascists”: supporters of “foreign” pine trees versus “native” 
fynbos (the fine-leaved botanical kingdom of the Cape that Kipling’s 
poem Anglicizes as “heath”). Yet at turn of the millennium, the dis-
course around botanical invaders took on a more ominous tone, moving 
beyond the rich suburbs set against the mountain to comprehend the 
changing social landscape of the Cape Flats. In a long and carefully 
argued account of Cape Town’s devastating wildfires of 2000, John and 
Jean Comaroff suggest that the vitriol directed toward the exotic plant 
species in the popular media—those “invaders” blamed for the feroc-
ity of the blaze, with an attendant rhetoric of indigeneity versus unbe-
longing—masked a desire to speak about human aliens from the rest of 
Africa: immigrants from Zimbabwe, Somalia, and the DRC who had 
arrived in the greater Cape Town area since 1994. Sentiments unable 
to be voiced explicitly in a climate officially opposed to all forms of dis-
crimination, they suggest, were displaced onto the natural world. And 
not only here: alien plants “have become the stuff of melodrama and 
resonant allegory on a worldwide scale. This, we shall argue, is because 
they transform and represent diffuse political terrors as natural facts” 
(639).9 
So far, one might say, so familiar. The work of cultural critique in 
the humanities is primed to show how such environmental discourses 
(like any others) are always interested, always (to borrow from Freud in 
addressing the peculiarly literal “dream topography” around us) overde-
termined: they exceed the terms in which they are ostensibly framed and 
become coded ways of talking about something else. 
The environmental humanities, however, cannot stay solely within 
such models. Such deconstructive “moves”—by now rather familiar, 
even predictable—are necessary but not adequate, at least if one wants 
to (like Carson) intervene in public debates and government policy. 
As such, I would add another point of friction between ecocritical and 
postcolonial methodologies to those that Nixon identifies. Among other 
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approaches in, say, a literary department, the environmental humani-
ties are distinct in their close relation with the natural sciences, and in 
particular with the science of ecology. As such, they cannot rest in the 
default scepticism often adopted toward “scientific rationalism” by post-
colonial methodologies. 
In her rich and influential work, Imperial Eyes (1992), for example, 
Mary Louise Pratt tracks the discursive shifts in travel writing produced 
by visitors to the Cape of Good Hope in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, among them Kolb (1719), Le Vaillant (1790), Barrow (1801), 
and Burchell (1824). “Natural history” following Linnaeus, she sug-
gests, can be seen as an “urban, lettered, male authority” that “extracted 
specimens not only from their organic or ecological relations with each 
other, but also from their place in other people’s economies, histories, 
social and symbolic systems” (31).10 This masculine, mechanistic, and 
extractive attitude to the natural world, then, is seen as the inception of, 
and continuous with, the environmental crises and postcolonial dispari-
ties of the twenty-first century.11 
Such critiques remain important and are in many ways unanswer-
able—but again, they are not sufficient. Departing from them, “ecocriti-
cism” must in the first instance accept scientific findings and scientific 
language; it must appeal to the claims of, say, oceanography or forestry, 
climate change or evolutionary biology, before it can contest, question, 
and extend them. It must, as Greg Garrard writes, distinguish between 
“problems in ecology” (properly scientific issues to be resolved by the 
formulation and testing of hypotheses) and “ecological problems” (fea-
tures of society arising out of our dealings with nature, from which we 
should like to free ourselves) (5–6).12 
In the hyper-linked and market-driven world of the twenty-first cen-
tury, there is a further reason for unease with critical methodologies that 
adopt knee-jerk reactions against “science” or “Enlightenment rational-
ity.” There is surely a danger in remaining within a broad (left-wing) 
critique of scientific method when it has been attacked so constantly in 
recent decades from the right. When a Bush-era report suggests that an-
thropogenic climate change is only one “narrative” among others, when 
Big Oil begins deploying the phrase historical carbon emissions and pro-
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nouncing that developing nations must be allowed to industrialise, there 
is the sense that progressive lines of argument have been hijacked by 
reactionary, market-driven forces committed to the status quo.13 One is 
presented with the uncomfortable spectacle of the lexicon of social jus-
tice (and even critical theory) being co-opted by right-wing lobbies and 
free-market think tanks. These are, after all, interests that have much 
to gain by making the same accusation traditionally made by left-wing 
critique: that a concern for the natural inevitably occurs at the expense 
of the social.
The workings of this political strategy are highly visible as soon as one 
types “Silent Spring” into Google. Websites proclaim that “Rachel Was 
Wrong,” sing the praises of DDT, accuse her of being responsible for the 
deaths of millions of Africans from malaria, and even compare her to 
Hitler and other mass-murderers of the twentieth century.14 As Naomi 
Oreskes and Erik Conway show in Merchants of Doubt (2010), not only 
are such accusations entirely false, they are disseminated by a network 
of interest groups that have been involved in the sowing of doubt about 
a range of scientific and public health issues throughout the twentieth 
century: the effects of tobacco smoke on the human body; the causes of 
acid rain; the effects of CFCs on the atmosphere; the science of climate 
change.15 
“Doubt,” in the infamous phrase of one tobacco executive in 1969, 
“is our product” (qtd. in Oreskes and Conway 34). And given that it 
is post hoc, the revisionist attack on Carson throws the workings of this 
anti-government, anti-regulation doctrine—which the authors dub “the 
Tobacco Strategy”—into sharp relief. The matter of DDT and pesti-
cide legislation in the US is by now an historical one, half a century 
old. Yet these corporate-funded campaigns exist not to overturn those 
specific policy decisions; rather, they work to discredit the very notion 
of scientific consensus: “[I]f you could convince people that science in 
general was unreliable, then you didn’t have to argue the merits of any 
particular case” (Merchants of Doubt 217); “you could use normal scien-
tific uncertainty to undermine the status of actual scientific knowledge. 
As in jujitsu, you could use science against itself ” (Merchants of Doubt 
34; emphasis in original). 
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It is here that Carson’s work and her vision of what science properly 
consists of might provide a way of thinking through this difficult discur-
sive terrain of both deep, valid complexity as well as artificial, cynically 
manufactured obfuscation. Re-reading her oeuvre today, one is able to 
track the exemplary way in which her texts translate complex research 
into public forms. One is also able to explore the “nature” of the sci-
ence that they broach: a rhetorical accomplishment which makes use 
of simplicity and well-known cultural archetypes yet which is at the 
same time capable of (to quote Keats again) “remaining content with 
half-knowledge” (942)—in this context, the requirement of scientific 
method to factor in and work with sites of unknowability.16 Indeed, as 
I hope to show, her work might allow us to think of a “literary ecology” 
that emerges not as a natural fact from which stable cultural values (“in-
digenous,” “harmony,” “balance”) can be derived but rather as a proc-
ess of constant flux and intellectual ramification: a thought experiment 
that presses against the limits of what can be imagined and what can be 
known. 
II
The littoral zone—that mysterious border that shifts restlessly 
between land and sea
Douglas Livingstone, A Littoral Zone (1991)
Carson’s ocean trilogy—Under the Sea-Wind (1941), The Sea Around 
Us (1951) and The Edge of the Sea (1955)—established her as perhaps 
the best known “nature writer” in the US. That very phrase, though, is 
an awkward one: for some it might conjure an outdated anodyne, or 
impossibly innocent kind of writing—the domain, perhaps, of amateur 
naturalists and purple prose. And certainly, what is intriguing about 
Carson’s trajectory as a writer is her move from self-contained and 
largely celebratory texts to the explicitly instrumental and elegiac reg-
ister of Silent Spring. As Roy remarks of her own shift from “novelist” 
to “writer-activist” (an ungainly coinage which she compares to “sofa-
bed”), it is a move that is regarded with some discomfort in the Anglo-
American circuits of literary review and reward because it shuns those 
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qualities that are conventionally lauded in literary appraisal: “I’m all for 
discretion, prudence, tentativeness, subtlety, ambiguity, complexity. . . . 
Most of the time” (Power Politics 11–12).17 
Yet in Carson there is less of a sharp break between the two modes, 
and her early works on the sea remain copious and often startling texts: 
writings that reveal the evolution of the distinctly literary ecology that 
accrues in Silent Spring. We have traced the “dream topographies” and 
depopulated landscapes of the colonial imaginary in South Africa, but it 
is worth stressing that Carson’s is a poetics that emerges in a deep sense 
not from land but from “the sea around us”: that planetary domain 
which was for millennia the conceptual horizon of human understand-
ings of the world. Far removed from what Coetzee calls “the backward 
glance of the pastoral” or the lone poet in a stony landscape rhapsodis-
ing over contested ground (White Writing 6–7), her 1951 biography of 
the ocean announces itself from the first lines as a collective and con-
temporary enterprise: “To cope alone and unaided with a subject so 
vast, so complex, and so infinitely mysterious as the sea would be a task 
not only cheerless but impossible, and I have not attempted it” (The Sea 
Around Us n.p.). 
Again, the apparent simplicity of these texts belies the immense com-
plexity of marine systems that they navigate for the lay reader—the 
geological formation of the ocean basins, the “global thermostat” of 
ocean currents, the “seasons” of the underwater year—and reading them 
today, they seem by turns familiar and surprising. They are familiar be-
cause they use narrative techniques that are now standard in the kind of 
“nature documentaries” screened endlessly on the Discovery Channel. 
In Under the Sea-Wind, for example, different species are used to “focal-
ise” the narrative as it follows the fortunes of a common sea bird like the 
sanderling in its yearly journey from Patagonia to the Arctic Circle. In 
The Sea Around Us, the many attempts to imagine the deep ocean realm 
surely prefigure the kind of breathless, David Attenborough-narrated 
footage that is now familiar from a BBC documentary like Blue Planet 
(2001), as the reinforced camera sinks to the ocean bed. 
Attempting to “map” the seabed imaginatively in the wake of echo-
grams, sonar, and the occasional deep-sea dive, many pages are devoted 
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to creating precisely such an effect via text, before it was possible on 
screen. The depiction of early underwater photography (with its tanta-
lising hints of bioluminescent organisms at enormous depth) reveals a 
stance that is open to new technologies for perceiving:
There are technical difficulties, such as the problem of holding 
a camera still as it swings at the end of a long cable, twisting 
and turning, suspended from a ship which itself moves with 
the sea. Some of the pictures so taken look as though the pho-
tographer has pointed his camera at a starry sky and swung it in 
an arc as he exposed the film. (The Sea Around Us 43)
It is a striking conjunction of two different frontiers of scientific knowl-
edge in the twentieth century—ocean trenches and distant galaxies. 
Yet by the same token, one reads with a sense of foreboding about the 
early “fathometers” used to locate herring in the North Sea, which then 
become post-war echograms locating great bodies of biomass at invisible 
depths: these prefigure in a more sinister way the “fish-finding” tech-
nologies now used by factory ships that trawl the open ocean.
If familiar in some ways, though, these sea-going texts are at the 
same time surprising in the way that they press against the unknown, 
and in their continual probing of the cultural sense that is made of the 
natural world. In an afterword to his 1991 collection of poems drawn 
from the experience of water sampling along South Africa’s KwaZulu-
Natal coastline, the poet and marine biologist Douglas Livingstone re-
marked: “The littoral zone—that mysterious border that shifts restlessly 
between land and sea—has, to me, always reflected that blurred and 
uneasy divide between humanity’s physical and psychic elements” (62). 
A similar and sustained blurring occurs throughout Carson’s writing, as 
it oscillates constantly between mythic and empirical understandings 
of the ocean: from the Book of Job to bathyscapes; echograms to fish-
ermen’s lore. The epigraphs to chapters range from Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest via Milton and Melville to Shelley and Swinburne: “The wind’s 
feet shine along the sea” (5). 
As Linda Lear shows in her biography, Carson was at first an English 
literature major while at Pennsylvania College for Women and deeply 
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immersed in the texts and traditions of English Romanticism. This lit-
erary affinity was marked on the fortieth anniversary of Silent Spring by 
a poetry anthology “provoked” by her work. Titled Wild Reckoning, it 
is prefaced by Jonathan Bate, whose Romantic Ecology (1991) and The 
Song of the Earth (2000) are formative texts in contemporary British 
ecocriticism, and conduct a long argument with the accusation that lit-
erary Romanticism involved a turning away from the socio-historical.18 
The epigraph for the anthology is taken from Carson’s The Edge of the 
Sea: 
Contemplating the teeming life of the shore, we have an 
uneasy sense of the communication of some universal truth 
that lies just beyond our grasp. What is the message signalled 
by the hordes of diatoms, flashing their microscopic lights in 
the night sea? What truth is expressed by the legions of the bar-
nacles, whitening the rocks with their habitations, each small 
creature within finding the necessities of its existence in the 
sweep of the surf? And what is the meaning of so tiny a being 
as the transparent wisp of protoplasm that is sea lace, existing 
for some reason inscrutable to us—a reason that demands its 
presence by the trillion amid the rocks and weeds of the shore? 
The meaning haunts and ever eludes us, and in its very pursuit 
we approach the ultimate mystery of Life itself. (249–50)
The writing is, perhaps, “lyrical,” but it is also angular and question-
ing. It does not (as is the case in the “nature writing” that gives the 
genre a bad name) rest or relax into the mere act of description and 
notation. Neither does it (to adapt Oscar Wilde’s famous put-down of 
Wordsworth) find in the shoreline the sermons that it had already hidden 
there.19 As in Livingstone’s more obviously modernist (and masculinist) 
poetics, the sense of some communication is “uneasy,” inscrutable, and 
bound up with the sensory experience of flux in the littoral zone itself. 
The verb forms toughen the writing: teeming, signalling, eluding. The 
sheer profusion of biomass “demands” a reason of us, even while suggest-
ing a superabundant materiality that can mean nothing in human terms: 
we are given an intuition of what George Steiner calls the “irreducible 
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weight of otherness, of enclosedness, in the texture and phenomenality 
of the material world” (140). Again, naïveté and complexity are finely 
balanced: the phrase “ultimate mystery of Life” might seem at first like 
the ultimate tired cliché. But if one shifts the emphasis from “meaning” 
to “life” and expands this beyond its usual (existential, anthropocentric) 
semantic range to mean the totality of biological life—the emergence of 
living cells in the pre-Cambrian seas; the “endless forms” of evolution; 
the “total relations” of the organism to its given environment—then one 
is able to regain some of the question’s power and wonder.
The phrases above are from Charles Darwin and Ernst Haeckel: the 
former from the famous closing passages of The Origin of Species (1859), 
the latter from Haeckel’s definition of his 1866 coinage “oekologie”, in 
which he writes:
By ecology we mean the body of knowledge concerning the 
economy of nature—the investigation of the total relations of 
the animal both to its inorganic and to its organic environ-
ment; including above all, its friendly and inimical relations 
with those animals and plants with which it comes directly 
or indirectly into contact—in a word, ecology is the study of 
all those complex interrelations referred to by Darwin as the 
struggle for the conditions of existence.20
Ecology, then, furnishes the trope of complexity par excellance within 
contemporary environmentalism and beyond: such complex condi-
tions, interrelations and investigations underwrite the notions of specia-
tion, habitat preservation, and biodiversity that are held as articles of 
faith by those who seek to protect the non-human world. 
Yet as Stephen Jay Gould (another great public science writer) re-
marked as early as the 1970s, the very range and capaciousness of 
“ecology” in everyday usage risks a dilution of its force. For while most 
of Haeckel’s coinages died with him, this word is facing the oppo-
site fate: “loss of meaning by extension and vastly inflated currency. 
Common usage now threatens to make ‘ecology’ a label for anything 
good that happens far from cities or anything that does not have syn-
thetic chemicals in it” (Ever Since Darwin 119). Indeed, the concept 
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of ecological complexity seems so unarguable and “natural” that it can 
be hard to see the cultural work that it is made to do. But as we shall 
see, several critics have questioned its axiomatic status in “green” criti-
cism, as well as the tendency of certain strains of ecocriticism to rely 
on seductive but rather glib analogies between biological systems and 
cultural texts.21 
With such caveats in mind, two further moments from The Sea Around 
Us might allow us to see the inflection that Carson gives to Darwinian 
thought. The first is a striking passage that imagines “the long snowfall” 
of sediments to the ocean floor:
When I think of the floor of the deep sea, the single over-
whelming fact that possesses my imagination is the accumula-
tion of sediments. I see always the steady, unremitting, down-
ward drift of materials from above, flake upon flake, layer upon 
layer—a drift that has continued for hundreds of millions of 
years, that will go on as long as there are seas and continents. 
(74)
Eroded mountain ranges, river silt, volcanic dust, desert sand, gravel 
in melt ice, the discarded shells of lime or silica from diatoms and ra-
diolaria—these sediments form “a sort of epic poem of the earth” (74), 
reaching a depth of 12,000 feet in the mid-Atlantic. “Mysterious and 
eerie are the immense areas, especially in the North Pacific, carpeted 
with soft, red sediment in which there are no organic remains except 
shark’s teeth and the ear bones of whales” (80). At the beginning of 
the chapter, she comments that the “book of the sediments has been 
opened only within the lifetime of the present generation of scientists,” 
since the advent of core drilling. At the end, she remarks (again rather 
ominously) that in our lifetimes “[t]he billions of Globigerina are drift-
ing down, writing their unequivocal record that this, our present world, 
is on the whole a world of mild and temperate climate. Who will read 
their record, ten thousand years from now?” (81).
Taking the liberty of passing between different domains via meta-
phor, I would suggest that Carson’s is a fundamentally sedimentary 
poetics: one that proceeds by the slow, patient accumulation of detail. 
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This might be compared to those writers who tend more toward the 
igneous or metamorphic: those who trust to language that is compressed 
into the modernist “image,” or torqued into more experimental and 
cryptic forms. Seamus Heaney’s “bog poems” are surely sedimen-
tary; Ted Hughes’ violent lyrics are igneous or metamorphic (so too 
the molten shapes of Sylvia Plath). A more local example might be 
found in an opposition between the poets Stephen Watson and Antjie 
Krog—though again, Carson disrupts the gendered assumptions that 
might begin to form around such a dichotomy. In fact, I would sug-
gest that the writer whom Carson comes to resemble most at such 
moments is Darwin himself: a scientist writing at a time when devel-
opments at the cusp of the discipline could still be shared with an au-
dience of non-specialists. 
Read in writerly terms, The Origin of Species and Silent Spring are simi-
lar in their slow and methodical building of a case (a case that many 
did not want to hear). Both works present their argument through a 
sometimes relentless accumulation of evidence; both are reluctant to 
move from the particular to the general, from the contingent to the 
theoretical. “Only gradually and retrospectively does the force of the 
argument emerge from the profusion of example,” writes Gillian Beer in 
her study of the language and literary consequences of Darwin’s work: 
“Such profusion, indeed, is the argument” (42; emphasis in original). 
In this sense, the fact that Darwin spent so much of his life working on 
barnacles is testament to an empiricism that was reluctant to extrapolate 
grand claims or larger cultural truths from the natural sciences—what 
Gould calls “the usual high road of broad implication” (“Worm for a 
Century” 201)—but has nonetheless been taken up by others for all 
manner of social, political, and ideological ends.
The emphasis given by Haeckel to economy and struggle in nature 
allies him with that social Darwinism intent on deriving a single teleol-
ogy for and moral from natural selection: a linear progression which 
(Beer writes) “reaches its point of satisfaction in the present” (17). Yet 
Gould (who always retained a left-leaning scepticism with regards to the 
politics of ecology) points out that Darwin’s initial term was not “evolu-
tion” but rather the less weighted “descent with modification”: 
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Ironically .  .  . the father of evolutionary theory stood almost 
alone in insisting that organic change led only to increasing ad-
aptation between organisms and their environment and not to 
an abstract ideal of progress defined by structural complexity or 
increasing heterogeneity. (Ever Since Darwin 37) 
In this radically materialist sense, the only “meaning” that can be derived 
from evolutionary theory is flux and the utter contingency of any value 
judgement: “fitness” signifies only the fit between a given organism and 
its immediate context. And although he could never rid himself of the 
residue of agency and intention that inheres in all language (the sense, 
that is, of natural selection being somehow purposive and directed), 
Darwin’s preferred metaphors were not ladders or linear trajectories but 
trees, “entangled banks,” and corals: a profuse, multi-dimensional and 
“meaningless” branching of life-forms in space and the unimaginable 
reaches of time unlocked by Charles Lyell’s new geology. 
This, then, is what a literary reading might allow us to explore, in 
being attuned to the encounter between the “endless forms” of evolu-
tionary theory and the ramifying, uncontrollable nature of language 
itself—its irresponsible rush to metaphor and wider signification. As 
Beer writes: 
Darwin could not fully formulate all that his ideas might mean, 
or come to mean, though from edition to edition he sought 
to steady their implications. He continued to try to establish 
boundaries between the scientific meaning and the possible ap-
plication of his work—but the language he had chosen and the 
story he had unfurled did not allow such rigid delimitation. 
The whole movement of The Origin is towards expansion, not 
stabilisation. (100; emphasis in original)
As a result, passages once taken as arguments for competition now read 
more as conservationist parables, testament to the wide and often con-
flicting range of meanings that can be derived from evolutionary theory. 
Contemporary environmentalism then inherits a riven, contradictory 
language that is amenable politically to both the left and right (and 
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indeed, to the apolitical): a metaphorics that varies according to what 
is taken as the prime unit of meaning (the gene, the individual, species, 
bioregion, planet?), and a vision of the social in which the “struggle for 
existence” could be glossed as a struggle for survival as much as con-
quest. Beer continues:
Darwin can be seen either as providing a grounding vocabu-
lary for colonialism, or . . . equally as resisting “intrusion” and 
idealising the closed environment of island spaces because they 
give opportunities for the most “natural” form of natural se-
lection in which the indigenous inhabitants uncover among 
themselves more and more ecological niches through the act 
of variation. (xxi)
In this sense it is intriguing that the remote oceanic island, so important 
a space in the genealogy of evolutionary thought, also forms a kind of 
centrepiece in The Sea Around Us (and the serialisation of this middle 
chapter in The Yale Review of September 1950 did much to ignite public 
interest in the work). The subject also leads to perhaps the strongest 
condemnation of human action in the book and the passage that most 
foreshadows Silent Spring:
The tragedy of the oceanic islands lies in their uniqueness, the 
irreplaceability of the species they have developed, by the slow 
process of the ages. In a reasonable world men would have treat-
ed these islands as precious possessions, as natural museums 
filled with beautiful and curious works of creation, valuable 
beyond price because nowhere else in the world are they du-
plicated. W. H. Hudson’s lament for the birds of the Argentine 
pampas might even more truly have been spoken of the islands: 
“The beautiful has vanished and returns not.” (96–97)
It is characteristically simple but loaded writing, as evolutionary con-
cepts of endemism and speciation blur into notions of heritage, intertex-
tuality, and aesthetics. The “stocking” of such islands over millennia (a 
metaphor implying oversight and directedness where, properly speaking, 
there is none); the uniqueness of the life-forms that evolved there (but a 
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uniqueness only perceptible by disruptive human agency); the clues that 
they offered to what Darwin (whom she quotes) called “that mystery of 
mysteries—the first appearance of new beings on earth”: all of these are 
set against the destruction that Carson traces as the European maritime 
empires come into being: “Upon species after species of island life, the 
black night of extinction has fallen” (94).
As such, the paradox that we have already traced in Carson’s ocean 
trilogy—that its reverent and lyrical response to the natural world is also 
in one sense a product of American naval power and invasive technolo-
gies—can be extended much further back. The same global networks of 
exploration and knowledge production that yield the voyage of HMS 
Beagle also herald the sixth great wave of extinction on earth. The forti-
eth anniversary edition of Silent Spring proclaims the book “The Classic 
that Launched the Environmental Movement,” but a work like Richard 
Grove’s Green Imperialism (1995) asks us to envision a much longer, 
more global and more vexed genealogy of environmentalism. 
The “diffusion model” suggested by the anniversary dust jacket (that 
environmentalism happens first in the West and is then exported to the 
rest) must be altered in favour of a reading that sees the discourse of con-
servation as in many ways a product of the European maritime empires 
encountering “the South.” Any attempt to understand the foundations 
of (Western) environmentalism, writes Grove, “actually involves writing 
a history of the human responses to nature that have developed at the 
periphery of an expanding European system” (12). This periphery—in 
particular the isolated colonial outposts of St. Helena, Mauritius, and 
the Cape of Good Hope where mariners impinged on closed ecosys-
tems—“became central to the formulation of Western environmental 
ideas” and remains crucial when constructing “an historical anthropol-
ogy of global environmental awareness” (12). 
Beyond this, one sees the difficulty in “thinking” ecology as a con-
cept: the circumscribed space and symbolic density of the remote island 
yield an irresistible metaphor of a stable, closed, and complex system. 
But such “total relations” can only be read by the disruptive human 
presence: they are produced by the very breach through which we have 
entered. The “museum” of the island ecosystem is one abstracted from 
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human society, one where any change is figured (conservatively) as 
harmful. It offers itself as a stable end-point to evolutionary processes—
even though notions of “climax” and “balance” are largely defunct in 
contemporary ecology, since they posit a human-centred timescale that 
is hardly admissible in the totality of organic evolution. “In fact, com-
plexity itself,” writes Dana Phillips, “once thought to guarantee ecologi-
cal stability, is now seen as, well, more complex than that” (22). And as 
Coetzee’s disenchanted Elizabeth Costello reminds us when lecturing 
on “The Poet and the Animals,” no less than the nineteenth-century 
picturesque or the prospects of Romanticism, our lay, almost mystical 
sense of an ecological connectedness inevitably turns on the privileged 
position of the viewing subject. It is a vision only available to a cultural 
text that reasserts its separation even as it seeks to exist as only one part 
of the whole. “Animals,” she remarks, “are not believers in ecology” (The 
Lives of Animals 54). 
III
. . . a complex, precise and highly integrated system . . . 
Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962)
Turning finally to Silent Spring, I hope once again to address the “sim-
plicity” of its prose surface not prior to but following an awareness of 
complexity: the variable politics and sedimented figurations that un-
derlie a concept like ecology. This dialectic between the simple and the 
complex is visible from the first pages of the work, with an author’s note 
stating that “I have not wished to burden the text with footnotes,” yet 
pointing toward the extensive and meticulous list of sources at the end of 
the book, should readers wish to “pursue some of the subjects discussed” 
(Carson vi). The principle is at work throughout the text, allowing the 
reader to enter at the desired level of complexity on a spectrum rang-
ing from fable and personal anecdote to peer-reviewed literature. It is a 
quality that makes the text an unusually adaptable one yet also renders 
it vulnerable to the charge that it absorbs all kinds of evidence and gives 
them all equal weighting. The “literariness” that I hope to explore, then, 
inheres not in its lyrical turn of phrase but in its tendency to move freely 
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(or to Carson’s detractors, irresponsibly) between different registers and 
orders of signification: from scientific findings to subjective testimony; 
from organic chemistry to well-worn cultural archetype and back again.
Nowhere is this strategy more visible (and more risky) than in the 
opening section, “A Fable for Tomorrow,” which begins in the form of 
a fairy tale: “There was once a town in the heart of America where all 
life seemed to live in harmony with its surroundings” (1). Describing 
how this small-town idyll is overcome by a “strange blight,” it com-
bines (as several critics have noted) two of the main narrative struc-
tures that modern environmentalism will draw on again and again: the 
idyll and the apocalypse. From the books of Genesis and Revelation 
to the post-apocalyptic imaginings of Margaret Atwood and Cormac 
McCarthy, such genres are deeply encoded into Judaeo-Christian cul-
tures of nature: the first and last words on the subject, as it were. Today, 
the prevalence of this pastoral/apocalypse “binary code” might go some 
way to explain the representational challenge that Nixon explores with 
regard to environmental crises. The complexity of a “wicked problem” 
like climate change continues to elude the ready-made narratives of last-
minute salvation or spectacular disaster propagated by the bestseller, 
eco-thriller, or Hollywood blockbuster. Rather than working through 
the processes of compromise, contraction, and mitigation that global 
warming requires, personal and political responses (as Al Gore remarked 
in An Inconvenient Truth) all too often retreat into either denial or fatal-
ism: responses that are, in part, the long-held cultural logics of pastoral 
and apocalypse continuing to play themselves out. 
In its historical moment, though, Silent Spring was still trying to 
bring such ideas of global, systemic pollution into conceptual focus and 
cultural currency, and doing so via a further combination of the very 
ancient and the very modern. Underwriting the book, as Ralph Lutts 
shows, is an unspoken analogy between pesticides and another form of 
“slow violence” that was invisible, cumulative but far more prevalent 
in public consciousness during the 1960s—that of nuclear fallout. The 
opening fable, then, is setting in motion both deep cultural archetypes 
as well as entirely contemporary imaginaries generated by the complex 
propaganda relays of the Cold War. Using Silent Spring to begin his 
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introduction on ecocriticism, Garrard remarks that (via such rhetorical 
operations) “the great achievement of the book was to turn a (scientific) 
problem in ecology into a widely perceived ecological problem that was 
then contested politically, legally and in the media and popular culture”; 
it was constructed not only to achieve certain political results (President 
John F. Kennedy’s Special Advisory Committee chief among them), but 
also “a subtle revision of the concept of ‘pollution’ itself ” (6–7).
Nonetheless, abstracted from a more complex whole, the deliber-
ate simplicity of the opening fable proved irresistible to those attack-
ing Carson. In October 1962 the public relations department of the 
Monsanto Corporation (an industry leader in the manufacture of ag-
ricultural pesticides) produced a parody entitled “The Desolate Year.” 
Attempting to mimic Carson’s prose, it evoked the perils of a world 
without pesticides:
Quietly then, the desolate year began. Not many people seemed 
aware of the danger. After all, in the winter, hardly a housefly 
was about. What could a few bugs do, here and there? How 
could the good life depend on something so seemingly trivial 
as bug spray? Where were the bugs anyway? The bugs were ev-
erywhere. Unseen. Unheard. Unbelievably universal. Beneath 
the ground, beneath the waters, on and in limbs and twigs 
and stalks, under rocks, inside trees and animals and other in-
sects—and yes, inside man. (Qtd. in Lear 431)
Parody, of course, is always an indirect form of tribute: it only works 
against forms that have achieved a certain level of cultural visibility (a 
status which it then confirms and amplifies). But it is worth probing 
why this particular example seems so ineffective. For one thing, the 
idea that “the bugs were everywhere” is a major part of Carson’s argu-
ment. In the chapter “Nature Fights Back” the text explores in great 
detail the vital importance of “natural” insect resistance (which indis-
criminate pesticide use would suppress) quoting the ecologist Robert 
Metcalf: “The greatest single factor in preventing insects from over-
whelming the rest of the world is the internecine warfare which they 
carry out among themselves” (247). And if the garden of the opening 
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fable is that of Eden, this chapter gives us a very different vision of a 
nocturnal hunting ground:
Most of us walk unseeing through the world, unaware alike of 
its beauties, its wonders and the strange and sometimes terrible 
intensity of the lives that are being lived about us. . . . Perhaps 
we may have noticed an oddly shaped insect of ferocious mien 
on a bush in the garden and been dimly aware that the pray-
ing mantis lives at the expense of other insects. But we see with 
an understanding eye only if we have walked in the garden at 
night and here and there with a flashlight have glimpsed the 
mantis stealthily creeping up upon her prey. . . . Then we begin 
to feel something of that relentless pressing force by which 
nature controls her own. (249)
One sees here how the “lyrical” dimension of Carson’s writing (which 
Monsanto attempts to ridicule) is being reconfigured for polemical 
effect. As with her passages about the “meaningless” profusion of oce-
anic life, the prose here engages what Steiner calls the “teeming strange-
ness and menace of organic presences” (140): not just the “relentless 
pressing force” of predation and resource competition, but also the sheer 
otherness of non-human life—the pressure that it exerts at the bounda-
ries of human representation.
Critics were quick to condemn Carson in gendered terms as senti-
mental and overly emotive, a bunny-loving amateur. But far from being 
a site of sentimental and self-indulgent evocation, the ecological “bal-
ance” of this night-time garden is disclosed as a resolutely materialist 
and pragmatic vision. Moreover, the chapter goes on to show that this 
equilibrium is itself not given or “natural,” anticipating the charge of 
innocence levelled at those framings of environmentalism that depend 
solely on a recourse to an Eden before the Fall:
In some quarters nowadays it is fashionable to dismiss the bal-
ance of nature as a state of affairs that prevailed in an earlier, 
simpler world—a state that has now been so thoroughly upset 
that we might as well forget it. . . . The balance of nature is not 
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the same today as in Pleistocene times, but it is still there: a 
complex, precise and highly integrated system of relationships 
between living things which cannot safely be ignored any more 
than the law of gravity can be defied with impunity by a man 
perched on the edge of a cliff. The balance of nature is not a 
status quo; it is fluid, ever shifting, in a constant state of adjust-
ment. (Carson 246)
“Complex, precise and highly integrated”—the phrase seems to offer 
itself as a description of the larger text. And much of its hidden com-
plexity resides, I would suggest, in an awareness of how ideas like “the 
simple” and “the complex” can be deployed as rhetorical strategies, 
either for or against environmentalist lobbies: that these are, in effect, 
tropes and speech acts just as much as neutral descriptors. The passage 
above, for example, shows how Silent Spring appeals to the “law” of 
natural systems while at the same time acknowledging their contin-
gency: “[T]he balance of nature is not a status quo.” And indeed, the 
suppleness of its argumentation seems to inhere in just this “balancing 
act,” as the text shuttles between value-judgement and contingency. At 
certain junctures, “nature” is personified and gendered in a way that 
seems impossibly quaint, but in the larger workings of the text, we are 
given a powerful sense of the social processes that constitute what is 
“natural”—“naturalisation,” that is, as a process of acquiescing in the 
contingent as if it were the inevitable: “Have we fallen into a mesmer-
ized state that makes us accept as inevitable that which is inferior or 
detrimental .  .  . ?” (12). She then quotes the ecologist Paul Shepard, 
who (in one of the broadest rhetorical strokes in the book) widens such 
thinking into a larger indictment of post-War American society: such 
thinking “idealizes life with only its head out of water, inches above the 
limits of toleration of the corruption of its own environment”: “Why 
should we tolerate a diet of weak poisons, a home in insipid surround-
ings, a circle of acquaintances who are not quite our enemies, the noise 
of motors with just enough relief to prevent insanity? Who would want 
to live in a world which is just not quite fatal?” (Shepard qtd. in Carson 
12). The rising tension of the rhetorical questions here and the broader 
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critique of a technologically administered society both seem to prefig-
ure an anti-globalisation stance like that of Roy quite distinctly. Indeed 
what makes Carson’s text still timely, and what links the two campaign-
ers most directly, is the way that each calls into question the credibility 
of the expert—and what one might call the politics of certainty—in a 
market-driven economy. “Who made the decision that sets in motion 
these chains of poisonings . . . ?”, we read in Silent Spring: “Who has de-
cided—who has the right to decide—for the countless legions of people 
who were not consulted . . . ?” (127; emphasis in original). In Roy’s “The 
End of Imagination,” similar questions are posed but in a more fervent 
register, given that there is (in her view) not even a language available to 
conduct a collective discussion about an issue like nuclear weapons in a 
country as divided as India: 
Who the hell is the prime minister to decide whose finger will 
be on the nuclear button . . . ? Who the hell is he to reassure 
us that there will be no accidents? How does he know? Why 
should we trust him? What has he ever done to make us trust 
him? What have any of them ever done to make us trust them? 
(161–62)
Yet equally, such passages reveal marked differences between their styles. 
Whereas Roy—as the celebrity “writer-activist”—is very much present 
in her essays, it is characteristic of Carson that moves towards larger 
cultural meanings are often made by citing others (so too the epigraphs 
by Albert Schweitzer and E. B. White), and such moments bring into 
focus the nature of the personal that is at work in the text. 
In her reflections on “The Modern Essay” (1925), Virginia Woolf re-
marked that “it is only by knowing how to write that you can make use 
in literature of yourself; that self which, while it is essential to literature, 
is also its most dangerous antagonist” (221). As a cultural critic always 
concerned with “the common reader,” she summarised the essayist’s 
dilemma: “Never to be yourself and yet always—that is the problem” 
(221). The lines suggest how difficult it is to isolate what constitutes 
a personal style, or signature, in any given text. Yet if parody usually 
works best when satirising an obtrusive sense of self-hood in writing 
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(the “dangerous antagonist” of self-importance and mere opinion), then 
Carson’s prose gave little opportunity for the public relations depart-
ment of Monsanto. 
Silent Spring reads as both an intensely personal document yet also 
one in which the narrative “I” has been sublimated to a remarkable 
extent—hence the repeated use of the first person plural: “we,” “our,” 
“us.” And it is hard not to read this as, in part, a product of deeply 
personal backstory that underwrites the work: Carson’s struggle with 
cancer and a range of other debilitating conditions prior to its publi-
cation, and her death soon after in April 1964. Her chronic ill health 
demanded an unusual distance from the text, even during the process 
of composition. Writing to a friend following an infection in 1961–62, 
she remarked that the only good thing in the experience was “the long 
time away from close contact with the book,” which may have gener-
ated the “broader perspective which I’ve always struggled for, but felt 
was not achieving”: “Now I am trying to write it all more simply and 
perhaps more briefly and with less exhaustive detail” (qtd. in Graham 
35). She was referring specifically to the third chapter, “Elixirs of 
Death,” a “Who’s Who” of industrial poisons (as she liked to call it) 
that proved one of the most difficult sections and was compulsively re-
written. “The material was overwhelming in volume, and often subtle 
in detail,” writes Frank Graham in an early survey of the book’s recep-
tion: “How could she get the story across to the great mass of read-
ers, untrained in science, who must ultimately provide the pressure that 
would bring about saner policies? How could she make chlorinated hy-
drocarbons compelling?” (35). 
Tracking the relation between the simple and the complex at this mo-
lecular level, one begins to discern, perhaps, the deep structure of the 
work. To understand the lethal nature of modern insecticides, Carson 
remarks, it is necessary to grasp how they are linked to “the basic chem-
istry of all life”: the almost infinite capacity of carbon atoms for uniting 
with each other and other substances in chains, rings, and other con-
figurations. Explaining via diagrams how chloroform and the cleaning 
fluid carbon tetrachloride can be produced from methane by simple 
substitutions of hydrogen atoms for chlorine, she goes on to say:
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In the simplest possible terms, these changes rung upon the 
basic molecule of methane illustrate what a chlorinated hydro-
carbon is. But this illustration gives little hint of the true com-
plexity of the chemical world of the hydrocarbons, or of the 
manipulations by which the organic chemist creates his infi-
nitely varied materials.  .  .  . By seemingly slight changes the 
whole character of the substance is changed; for example, not 
only what is attached but the place of attachment to the carbon 
atom is highly important. Such ingenious manipulations have 
produced a battery of poisons of truly extraordinary power. 
(20)
Here then is the “grammar” not only of agricultural pesticides but of 
organic evolution itself: a system that produces immense complexity 
from a series of simple propositions. Human language, as Wilhelm von 
Humboldt showed, is a system that makes infinite use of finite means: 
an insight that has been fundamental for both linguists and geneticists 
in the twentieth century. And beyond her customary skill at synthesis 
and visualisation, what Carson’s hard-won attempt to dramatise the dia-
lectic of the simple and complex at the atomic level sets in motion is an 
aspect of the text that still reads as contemporary. It is the way that Silent 
Spring relocates the concept of ecology from “out there” (the wilderness, 
the forest reserve, the oceanic island) to “in here.” Able to move between 
different worlds and different scales, it brings the ecological vision into 
more intimate and proximate spaces: the garden, the household, and 
finally the human body itself. Having described the “web of life—or 
death” in a river system, Carson writes:
But there is also an ecology of the world within our bodies. In 
this unseen world minute causes produce mighty effects; the 
effect, moreover, is seemingly unrelated to the cause, appearing 
in a part of the body remote from the area where the original 
injury was sustained. “A change at one point, in one molecule 
even, may reverberate throughout the entire system to initi-
ate changes in seemingly unrelated organs and tissues,” says a 
recent summary of the present status of medical research. (189)
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One senses the personal here, even as it is sublimated: Carson attempt-
ing to filter and simplify her text, even while struggling with her own 
ailing body. 
Following this, it is revealing to close with two very different versions 
of what science might consist of, each appearing in Lear’s biography. 
The first is from a column by R. Milton Carleton, a “ubiquitous critic 
for industry associations” and member of the National Association of 
Science Writers who objected strongly to Carson’s work in his gardening 
column. Silent Spring, he wrote, “is NOT a scientific work” (431). Full 
of errors not noticeable to the lay reader, it was the result of “a writer 
who has ventured into an unknown field and had absorbed all sorts 
of evidence, some of it sound, some of it worthless, and given every-
thing equal billing” (431). Beyond all the gendered attacks on Carson, 
this is the larger critique that still carries weight: the idea that scientific 
discourse must (like any other) proceed by limiting its field, and that 
Carson’s continual, metaphorical “crossings” between registers, between 
anecdotal detail and peer-reviewed journals, result in a dilution of the 
text. 
Yet another, very different idea of what science consists of appears in 
a letter from Carson to her doctor George Crile in 1960, following his 
frank diagnosis of the cancer that was spreading through her body:
You smiled when I suggested that medicine could ever be scien-
tific, but one of the things I appreciate in you, and one of the 
things I mean by “scientific,” is your awareness of what is not 
known and your unwillingness to rush in with procedures that 
may disrupt that unknown but all-important ecology of the 
body cells. I appreciate, too, your having enough respect for 
my mentality and emotional stability to discuss this all frankly 
with me. (Qtd. in Lear 379–80; emphasis in original)
The remarks take on added weight following Carson’s unhappiness with 
her previous physician and Lear’s speculation that she may not have 
been provided with the facts about her condition earlier because, ac-
cording to medical protocols of the 1950s and 60s, a diagnosis of ma-
lignancy would generally be given to the husband of the woman being 
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examined; as an unmarried woman whose most intense relationship was 
with another woman (Dorothy Freeman), Carson did not fit this social 
paradigm (Lear 368). Carleton’s idea of science writing as commanding 
a strictly defined field and of confidently separating valid from invalid 
forms of knowledge is modified here by an awareness of the scientific 
method having always to work with sites of profound unknowability 
and unpredictability. Tellingly, it is a vision that is derived from the 
bringing of her ecological vision into the most personal domain im-
aginable. If critiques of ecology as a metaphor often focus on how it 
relies on distant, undisturbed systems, or how the perceiving human 
intelligence reasserts its separation from the world even as it proclaims 
interconnection, then here we have something very different: a vision of 
science that is embodied in a startlingly literal sense: an ecology of cells 
and tissue that is already, inevitably, and fatally disturbed. 
If Carson was able to raise such issues with her physician and a few 
close friends, her rapidly spreading illness was something that she 
worked hard to keep out of the public domain, worried that it might 
distract attention from the work and make her book vulnerable to fur-
ther charges of overstatement and hysteria. The personal backstory is 
meticulously suppressed and sublimated, yet it surely contributes to the 
tone of elegy that pervades Silent Spring, a quality that reveals itself, 
perhaps, in the more obviously “literary” moments of the text where 
Carson’s immersion in a rich network of canonical texts shows through. 
To cite just one example in closing: at the end of the chapter “Needless 
Havoc,” she describes the painful deaths suffered by birds and ground 
squirrels affected by the unselective use of insecticides—or as she re-
named them (with characteristic attention to language), “biocides.” The 
attitude in death of such small creatures—head and neck outstretched 
and mouth containing dirt, “suggesting that the dying animal had been 
biting at the ground”—leads her to close with the question: “By acqui-
escing in an act that can cause such suffering to a living creature, who 
among us is not diminished as a human being?” (100). The prose makes 
itself vulnerable, certainly, to the charge of sentimentality, but underly-
ing and strengthening the language is a verbal echo of John Donne’s 
famous “Meditation XVII”:
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No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the 
continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the 
sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well 
as if a manor of thy friend’s or of thine own were; any man’s 
death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and 
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls 
for thee. (1305)
This biblically inflected, narrating “I” that is “involved in mankind” and 
“diminished” by any loss of the larger social totality is one that Carson’s 
text seems intent on relating to all organic life. In its continual attention 
to the cultural sense that we make of the natural world, her oeuvre sug-
gests “the human” itself as a quality constructed out of and calibrated by 
our relations with the “endless forms” produced by evolution. As such, 
it seems apt that the metaphor of the isolated oceanic island is refused 
here; rather than the static “museum” of natural forms in The Sea Around 
Us, we are offered, via an intricate pattern of allusion in Carson’s work, 
a transformative “literary ecology” that braids together nature writing, 
polemic, and deeply personal intimations of mortality. And as her biog-
rapher points out, such sounds and sea-going metaphors were echoed 
again in the lines from T. S. Eliot’s “The Dry Salvages” that were read 
at the scattering of Carson’s ashes along the coast at Sheepscot in the 
summer of 1964:
     The sea has many voices . . .
The distant rote in the granite teeth . . .
And under the oppression of the silent fog
The tolling bell
Measures time not our time, rung by the unhurried
Ground swell, a time older than chronometers, older 
Than time counted by anxious worried women
Lying awake, calculating the future.
Trying to unweave, unwind, unravel
And piece together the past and the future,
Between midnight and dawn, when the past is all deception,
The future futureless, before the morning watch
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When time stops and is never ending;





 1 This paper emerges from a symposium held at the University of Cape Town 
in May 2012 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. 
Hosted by the Institute for the Humanities in Africa (HUMA), the event was 
intended to explore the contemporary resonances of Carson’s text from the glo-
bal South and also to consider the emerging field of the environmental humani-
ties. Writers, historians, literary scholars, and social anthropologists were asked 
to intervene in debates where the voices of natural scientists are typically more 
prominent.
 2 Following the serialisation of Silent Spring in The New Yorker, a former Secretary 
of Agriculture supposedly wrote a letter to Dwight Eisenhower wondering “[w]hy 
a spinster with no children was so concerned about genetics?”, concluding that 
she was “probably a Communist.” As Lear remarks in her biography, “the remark 
was repeated so many times that its origin became inconsequential” (429). See 
Roy’s “On Citizens’ Rights to Express Dissent” for a description of the array 
of petitions filed against her. In July 1999, following Roy’s protest against the 
Sardar Sarovar dam project, criminal charges were laid against her and the In-
dian Supreme Court conducted hearings to decide whether the dignity of the 
court had been violated: “vicious stultification and vulgar debunking cannot be 
permitted to pollute the stream of justice . . . we are unhappy at the way in which 
the leaders of NBA and Ms. Arundhati Roy have attempted to undermine the 
dignity of the Court. We expected better behaviour of them” (Power Politics 97).
 3 Buell pays careful attention to the text in his influential (and canon-forming) 
The Environmental Imagination. See also Waddell’s And No Birds Sing.
 4 I have adapted this list from Nixon’s “Environmentalism and Postcolonialism.”
 5 As Lewis points out in “Smokey the Bear in Vietnam,” the motto of the “Ranch 
Handers” was a sardonic adaptation of the well-known US Forest Service post-
ers: “Only you can prevent a forest”—a grim splicing of the discourses of domes-
tic conservation and international aggression (598–603).
 6 See Rotberg’s The Founder. 
 7 This scheme to “improve the amenities of the Cape” is fictionalised in Har-
ries’ novel Manly Pursuits, in which Professor Wills, a reclusive Oxford don and 
ornithologist, is responsible for supervising the release of two hundred English 
songbirds into forests of the Groote Schuur estate. Confused by the change of 
hemisphere and season, the nightingales and chaffinches refuse to sing. 
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 8 Phrases from Kipling’s poem “The Burial” [1912], one stanza of which is en-
graved on the Rhodes Memorial, further up the slopes (209).
 9 In her account of South African literature and the politics of place, Barnard 
links their argument to Gordimer’s 1974 novel The Conservationist. Focalised 
through a wealthy Johannesburg industrialist who retires to a plot of veld, this 
apartheid-era “story of an African farm” reveals how “the discourse of the eco-
logical preservation is . . . exposed as an alibi for territorial possession and poli-
cies of exclusion: it offers a way in which the white landowner can express his 
anxiety about black trespassers and encroaching townships without seeming to 
be as crudely racist as his less aesthetically attuned Afrikaans neighbours.” The 
Comaroffs, Barnard concludes, “transpose Gordimer’s critique of the ideology 
of conservation onto a grand international scale, one appropriate to an era of 
globalisation” (173).
 10 Several environmental historians have since challenged Pratt’s account. See for 
example Grove’s Green Imperialism and Beinart’s The Rise of Conservation in 
South Africa. Beinart writes that there is a danger of oversimplifying this tradi-
tion of writing: “Knowledge was built from a multiplicity of indigenous and 
colonial agents, each with different languages, modes of living, and views of 
nature” (29).
 11 Merchant voices a stronger version of this argument in The Death of Nature.
 12 See the introductory sections in Garrard, Ecocriticism (5–6). In the often over-
wrought debates about botanical “invaders” on the slopes of Table Mountain—
which have tended to resolve into pine (colonial, bad) versus fynbos (native, 
good)—one would need to disaggregate cultural subtexts from valid ecological 
concerns. To distinguish, for example, between the stone pines (Pinus pinea) and 
the cluster pines (Pinus pinaster): the latter spread rapidly by seed and pose a fire 
danger; the former do not, and are slowly disappearing from the cultural land-
scape as they become “senescent” and drop their branches around the Rhodes 
Memorial.
 13 See for example “The Ultimate Corporation,” McKibben’s review of Private Em-
pire: ExxonMobil and American Power (2012) by Coll. Supported by Exxon, the 
American Petroleum Institute aimed in the 1990s to ensure that “recognition 
of uncertainties” became part of public discourse on the topic and that media 
coverage recognised “the validity of viewpoints challenging the current ‘conven-
tional wisdom’” (54). If one replaces the phrase “media coverage” with “textual-
ity,” and “conventional wisdom” with “grand narrative,” one has the standard 
operating procedure, perhaps, for a literary studies seminar at a liberal arts col-
lege during the same period.
 14 “Millions of people around the world suffer the painful and often deadly effects 
of malaria because one person sounded a false alarm. That person is Rachel Car-
son” (Project of the Competitive Enterprise Institute). 
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 15 In rebutting the charge that Carson’s campaign against DDT lead to deaths from 
malaria, the authors make two main points. Firstly, that mosquito resistance to 
malaria was already making the use of the chemical ineffective by the 1960s. 
Secondly, the United States ban on DDT in 1971 did not apply outside that 
country, and the Environmental Protection Agency had no authority over other 
nations (i.e., Carson’s book and the policy changes it precipitated had nothing 
to do with what did or did not happen in Africa). Since 2000, articles defend-
ing DDT have appeared from the Heartland Foundation and been parroted by 
talk-show hosts such as Rush Limbaugh (217). See the Guardian website for a 
valuable curation by Hickman of articles reflecting on the fiftieth anniversary of 
Silent Spring and tracking such debates across left- and right-wing online plat-
forms: “What is the Legacy of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring?” 
 16 The phrase is from Keats’ famous definition of “Negative Capability” in 1817: 
“what quality went to form a Man of Achievement especially in literature & 
which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean Negative Capability, that 
is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts without any 
irritable reaching after fact & reason—Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a 
fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of mystery, from being 
incapable of remaining content with half knowledge” (942). 
 17 As the title of Roy’s essay suggests, the compound “writer-activist” might also 
violate a set of gendered assumptions regarding the amateur and professional, 
the lyrical and the technical: “The Ladies Have Feelings So . . . Shall We Leave it 
to the Experts?” (Power Politics 1).
 18 The introduction to Romantic Ecology has proved an important document in 
Anglo-American ecocriticism, particularly the passages where Bate calls for a 
shift from “red” to “green” and makes the point that the broadly Marxian cri-
tique of the concept “nature” risks dovetailing with the workings of extractive, 
highly capitalised approaches to the biosphere: “Nature is a term that needs to 
be contested, not rejected. It is profoundly unhelpful to say ‘There is no nature’ 
at a time when our most urgent need is to address and redress the consequences 
of human civilization’s insatiable desire to consume the products of the earth.” 
Both free-market and Marxian framings of “nature,” he seems to suggest, in-
strumentalise the non-human world: another example of the difficulty in disag-
gregating progressive from reactionary critique in the discourses surrounding 
environmentalism (56). 
 19 “Wordsworth went to the Lakes, but he was never a lake poet. He found in 
stones the sermons he had already hidden there” (Wilde 909).
 20 Haeckel coined the word “oekologie” in his Generelle Morphologie der Organis-
men (Berlin, 1866), giving this more extended gloss in a paper of 1870. 
 21 See Phillips, The Truth of Ecology, for a polemical critique of the over-reliance on 
metaphor and glib analogy in American ecocriticism and an impatience with its 
devotional, even anti-intellectual quality.
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